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Abstract
Some parallels are drawn between Celso Furtado’s structural and Douglass North’s
neo-institutional approaches to economic history. It is argued that both authors
interpreted the economic history of Brazil and the United States respectively in the
context of the investigation of the economic growth process, under the inﬂuence of the
staples approach to trade and growth. Against some commentators, it is shown that
Furtado did pay attention to quantitative evidence. The role of colonial rules is also
highlighted in the search for an explanation of the divergent long-run performances
of the Brazilian and North-American economies.
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Resumo
São traçados alguns paralelos entre as abordagens a historia econômica por Celso
Furtado (estruturalista) e Douglass North (neo-institucionalista). È argumentado que
ambos os autores interpretaram as respectivas historias econômicas do Brasil e dos
Estados Unidos no contexto da investigação do processo de crescimento econômico,
sob inﬂuencia da abordagem da mercadoria básica ao comercio exterior e crescimento.
Contra alguns comentadores, é mostrado que Furtado prestou atenção a evidencia
quantitativa. O papel das regras coloniais é também destacado na busca por uma
explicação das performances divergentes de longo prazo das economias brasileira e
norte-americana.
1. Introduction
Between 1959 and 1961 two seminal books that would change the historical
interpretation of long-term growth in Brazil and the United States came out:
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Formação Econômica do Brasil (translated in 1963 as The Economic Growth
of Brazil – A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times) by Celso Furtado, and
The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860, by Douglass North.
Whereas Furtado’s book – written in the academic year 1957-58 he spent at
Cambridge University upon leaving his position as director of the development
division of CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America)
– was the ﬁrst comprehensive application of the structuralist approach to
the economic history of a Latin American country (see e.g. Love (2005,
pp. 110–16); Boianovsky (2008)), North’s monograph was one the founding
works of the “New Economic History” in North American historiography (see
e.g. Engerman 1977; Myhrman e Weingast 1994). Both volumes represented
the culmination of previous contributions by Furtado ([1948] 2001, 1950, 1954)
and by (North 1955, 1956). Furtado’s main historiographic piece after Formação
was his economic history of Latin America (Furtado [1969] 1970), which was a
further elaboration of structuralist historical analysis. North’s (1966) next book
extended the investigation of American economic growth to other periods. He
would gradually elaborate on the role of institutions in economic growth, which
eventually became his foremost research topic (North 1981, 1990).
Although both economists investigated history in order to grasp the process
of economic growth in their respective countries, it should be noted that, while
Furtado tried to make sense of the Brazilian economy’s relative backwardness,
North attempted to explain the broad American economic success. There is no
indication that the two authors cited each other, although they may have met
when North (1961b) visited Rio in 1961 to lecture on economic history and
regional economic growth – a topic dear to Furtado for reasons of economic
theory and policy. Moreover, as argued below, Furtado was probably aware of
North’s (1956) article by the time he wrote Formação.
The notion that the gap between the income per capita of Brazil and other
Latin American countries on one side and North America (Canada and the
United States) on the other originated not in the 20th but in the 18th and
(especially) the 19th centuries has become widely accepted in modern economic
historiography (see e.g. Coatsworth 1998). The average rates of growth in most
Latin American economies in the 20th century were close to that of the United
States. The attempted interpretation of the causes and consequences of that
lag has dominated Latin American social science in general and economic
historiography in particular since the ﬁrst decades of the past century (see
Hirschman 1961). As often pointed out by commentators (see e.g. Stark 1964;
Dean 1965; Baer 1974), Furtado’s 1959 study sought to provide an answer to
the question: “why did Brazil fall behind?”
Indeed, in the second volume of his autobiography, Furtado (1991, pp.
114–15) recalled that
As part of the study of the countries that were formed on American lands as a
projection of the European expansion, the North-American experience acquires a
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particular meaning. No other issue obsessed me as much as this one: why did they
ﬁnd the right way – the way of development – and we the wrong one, that of
underdevelopment?
Some representatives of the New Economic History have claimed that
Furtado’s Formação and the structuralist historiography in general were not
up to the task, since their critical attitude toward neoclassical economics
had led them to eschew the “powerful analytic and quantitative methods of
growth economics” (Haber 1997a, p. 8). Haber (1997a, p. 23) acknowledged that
Furtado did make use of quantitative data, but just for purposes of description,
not as part of hypothesis testing in the way the New Economic Historians
like North and others were starting to do for American economic history.
Accordingly, some crucial features of the historical dynamics of Brazilian and
Latin American economies – such as the key role of foreign trade in fostering
economic growth and the perverse inﬂuence of colonial institutions on long-term
economic development – would only come out, so the argument goes, after
the systematic application of the New Economic History approach to the
investigation of Latin American history, started in the 1980s (Haber 1997a;
Ficker 2005). In the same vein, North e Weingast (2000, pp. 7–8) have hailed
the “emerging new economic history of Latin America” for
(i) making a break with “dependency explanations” of the region’s lagged
growth,
(ii) integrating history, economics and politics – which they found missing in
the old structuralist literature on Latin American development – and
(iii) emphasizing the testing of clearly speciﬁed hypotheses.
Such claims by some New Economic Historians have not gone unchallenged,
though. As pointed out by Coatsworth (2005, p. 132, n. 18), CEPAL carried out
path breaking empirical research in the 1950s on the past performance of Latin
American economies, as part of its work on economic planning (see e.g. CEPAL
(1956), a report drafted by a team under Furtado’s supervision). Moreover,
the suggestion that structuralist-dependist historiography had overlooked the
links between history, economics and politics, reﬂected extensive ignorance
about that literature. The goal of the present paper is to compare some
aspects of Furtado’s and North’s approaches to economic history. Although
North (1974, 1978, 1981) would eventually become critical of the neoclassical
origins of the cliometric revolution and argue for a larger role for institutional
analyses in the study of history, I shall refer to New Economic History in
the broad sense as encompassing the application of economic theory to the
understanding of institutional change (see McCloskey 1994; Haber 1997a). The
next section shows that North’s concern with the inﬂuence of institutions on
long-run economic performance has brought him close to Furtado’s structuralist
economic history. That is followed by a discussion of the role of the staples
approach to economic development in both North’s and Furtado’s frameworks.
Finally, the paper explores the increasingly inﬂuential hypothesis that the
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lagged growth of Latin American economies was largely the result of colonial
institutions arrangements that were adverse to long-term development (see
Nunn (2009) for a survey of that literature).
2. Economic Structures and History
Furtado’s contribution to economic history was part of his life-long eﬀort
to understand the economic underdevelopment of Latin American countries,
which could only be grasped through historical investigation (Furtado (1987,
pp. 205–06); Boianovsky (2010, section 1)).
Why are these countries underdeveloped? Is this an evolutionary stage or a
structural conﬁguration that tends to perpetuate itself? The need to think in
historical terms has led me to pose a methodological question: what can the social
sciences, and especially economics, contribute to history? European historians of
the Ecole des Annales asked a similar question. They sought help from the social
sciences. I, as a social scientist, sought it from history (Furtado 1987, p. 205).
Although Furtado did his graduate studies in Paris in the late 1940s, he
remained unaware until the mid 1960s – when he returned to France to
teach at the Sorbonne – of the approach of the Ecole des Annales, which
dominated quantitative French history (Furtado 1985, p. 167). The French
Annales school, just like the American New Economic History, pursued the
development of quantiﬁcation, but their respective conceptions of history were
distinct. Whereas the former investigated the past in search for general laws
of historical development, the latter saw economic history as a ﬁeld to test
empirical propositions based on a general theory (see Perez-Brignoli e Ruiz
(1984, p. 209)). As recalled by Furtado (1985, p. 167), his aim “was not to
‘explain’ History, sliding into forms of reductionism in which Marx and many
other thinkers of the 19th century have fallen”. The idea was to increase the
perception of history by using the resources of economics, especially through
the devise of macroeconomic models that could shed light on the dynamics
of certain economic structures, such as the sugar economy of the Brazilian
Northeast in the colonial age. In particular, Formação was designed as a
collection of “interpretative hypotheses” taken from economic analysis. The
approach consisted in drawing “precise questions” from economics, and getting
answers in history (ibid, pp. 205 and 215).
The reactions of some reviewers of the book indicate that Furtado largely
succeeded in his endeavor. Mueller (1963, pp. 359-60) described it as an eﬀort to
“integrate a variety of growth models into a moving historical matrix” and called
attention to its “thought-provoking ideas as well as some daring model building”.
Another reviewer was impressed by Furtado’s “ingenuity in making statistical
estimates from existing data with their typical lacunae for the earlier years
especially” (Lester 1960, p. 210). Baer (1974, pp. 114–15), one of the pioneers
in the application of the methods of the New Economic History to the Brazilian
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economy (Haber 1997a, p. 23, n. 15), dismissed charges that Formação was
“unquantitative and undervidenced”, and pointed out that Furtado was “one
of the ﬁrst economists to attempt to use modern income analysis in dealing
with historical phenomena”. Those charges had been made by C. M. Pelaez
and some other early supporters of the New Economic History in Brazil in
the 1960s and 1970s (see Perez-Brignoli e Ruiz 1984). The ﬁrst major event at
which historians debated the application of quantitative methods to Brazilian
economic history was the 1971 international conference on “The quantitative
history of Brazil from 1800 to 1930”, organized by French historian Frederic
Mauro in Paris. Furtado contributed on that occasion a methodological paper
on “Economic analysis and quantitative history”, in which he asked whether
“economic analysis in general and macroeconomics in particular could help to
enrich the vision we get from history” (Furtado 1973, p. 24). According to
Furtado,
Quantitative history does not exist outside a certain analytical frame, which allows
classifying the data, choosing the variables, establishing a causal relation between
the movements of certain variables etc. That analytical frame is provided to us,
essentially, by economics (ibid).
The particular kind of economic analysis that Furtado underlined as part of
the tool box of the historian was “structural analysis”, which in his view made
possible to take into account at the same time economic and non-economic data
(p. 26). Formação did not include any explicit statements about methodology.
It was in the preface to his next book that Furtado ([1961] 1964, p. vii)
explained that the variety of stages of (under)development and historical
situations in diﬀerent countries had induced him to “adopt a structural view
of economic problems” and to attempt to identify factors that are speciﬁc for
each structure. He would return to the topic of structuralist methodology in
his 1965 Yale paper and especially in the appendix to the ﬁrst part of his
1967 book. The distinguishing feature of economic structuralism (as opposed
to the French structuralist school of the anthropologist Claude Lévy-Strauss)
was the emphasis on “non-economic parameters” in macroeconomic models;
the economist’s task (especially in his role as economic historian) was to turn
those parameters into variables (Furtado [1967] 1975, pp. 83–84). Since the
behavior of economic variables depends on those parameters, which “take form
and evolve in a historical context”, it is not possible to separate the study of
economic phenomena from their historical context (Furtado 1987, p. 210). Such
non-economic parameters were occasionally described by Furtado (1965, p. 159)
as “institutional parameters”, although he did not suggest any conceptual
links to the old American institutionalists (for a comparison between Latin
American structuralism and the old North American institutionalist school
see Mallorquin (2001)). Indeed, Furtado ([1961] 1964, p. viii) would leave the
American institutionalists and the German Historical School out of his study
of growth theories, on the grounds that they had played mainly a “critical
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role”, without any systematic contribution to the interpretation of the process
of growth.
Just like Furtado’s, North’s early research program in economic history
reﬂected the increasing interest in growth economics in the 1950s, especially
under the guise of the historical-quantitative investigations launched by Moses
Abramowitz and Simon Kuznets (see Boianovsky (2010); cf. Haber (1997a,
p. 2)). According to North (1966, p. 1), economic history focuses on economic
growth and its eﬀects on the welfare of the various segments of the society.
One can ﬁnd only sparse explicit remarks about the role of institutions in
North’s writings in the 1950s and 1960s, reﬂecting his contempt for the old
American institutionalist kind of economic history. North intended his 1961
book as a break with old style economic history, which he criticized for its
concern with “description and institutional change” and “only incidental focus
on the process of economic growth”, which he blamed for the absence of
comprehensive historical analysis of American development. After the boom of
the New Economic History, North shifted the target of his criticism. His 1971
volume with Lance Davis oﬀered a new interpretation of American economic
growth based on the process of creation of new institutional arrangements and
forms of economic organization. The issue was examined in two methodological
papers (North 1974, 1978), followed by his 1981 book, in which he further
contributed to the approach known as “neo-institutional” economics. The idea
was not to go back to traditional descriptive economic history, but to provide a
theory about the evolution of the constraints faced by agents in their economic
choices.
The cliometric revolution in economic history wedded neoclassical economics and
quantitative methods in order to describe and explain the performance of economies
in the past. Economic history gained in rigor and scientiﬁc pretension, but at the
expense of exploring a much more fundamental set of questions about the evolving
structure of economies that underlies performance. Cliometrics have turned their
back on a long tradition stretching back from Joseph Schumpeter to Karl Marx
to Adam Smith. These scholars regarded economic history as essential because it
added a dimension to economics. Its purpose was to analyze the parameters held
constant by the economist ((North 1978, p. 963); italics added).
North’s call for the incorporation of structural change into economic history
is reminiscent of Furtado’s plea for the historical-structural method. He would
deﬁne structure as “those characteristics of a society which we believe to be the
basic determinants of performance”, such as political and economic institutions,
technology, demography and ideology (North 1981, p. 3). The two building
blocks developed by North to understanding structural change and growth are
(i) a theory of property rights to account for the forms of economic
organization devised to reduce transaction costs and organize exchange
and
(ii) a theory of the state to account for speciﬁcation of the property rights
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structure.
Although the concept of transaction costs was not integrated into the
framework of Latin American structuralists, the notion of property rights was
part and parcel of their approach, as illustrated by the key role played by
institutions such as landownership system, control of ﬁrms by foreign capital
and slavery in the interpretation of the long-term economic performance of
the region. Furthermore, the growth record has been deeply inﬂuenced by the
pattern of insertion of those regions – North and Latin American alike – in the
international economy, as discussed next.
3. Growth and the Staples Approach
As mentioned in the introduction, the historical argument in Furtado’s
Formação reﬂected his concern with the causes of the distinct long-term growth
patterns of Brazil and the United States. The issue had been discussed by
Brazilian intellectuals from political, cultural and anthropological perspectives
– see Vianna Moog [1954] 1964, probably the best known comparative
discussion of the Brazilian and American societies before Furtado’s book –
but a thorough economic investigation of the issue was still lacking by the late
1950s.
The question has often been asked: Why did the United States become an industrial
nation in the nineteenth century, keeping abreast of the European countries,
whereas Brazil evolved in such a manner that it became a vast underdeveloped
region in the twentieth century? Putting aside the superstitious fatalism implicit in
the theories of inferiority of climate and race which have for some time prevailed,
the issue has acquired a more precise meaning from the economic point of view
(Furtado [1959] 1963, p. 108).
The key piece of information to solve the puzzle would be provided by the
respective rates of growth of Brazil and the US throughout the 19th century.
Furtado ([1959] 1963, p. 164) referred to estimates made by Kuznets for the
NBER, which indicated an average rate of growth of per capita income of 1.9%
for the US in the period 1850-1950. Data on Brazilian long-run rates of growth
were not yet available at the time, which led Furtado to attempt an estimation
based on information about the value of exports and calculation of terms of
trade. The annual rate of increase of the sterling value of Brazilian exports in
the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, after the decline of the gold mining cycle
by the third quarter of the 18th century, was only 0.8%, whereas population
increased 1.3% per year. Moreover, Furtado estimated that the terms of trade
declined 40% in that period, which led him to infer that real per capita income
fell between 1800 and 1850. The economic stagnation reﬂected also the relative
increase of the subsistence sector, of lower productivity than the exports sector,
which generally took place during periods of stagnation of exports before the
start of the industrialization process in the 20th century (Furtado [1959] 1963,
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chapter 19).
By mid 19th century, the growth of the coﬀee economy would change
dramatically the Brazilian economic landscape. The amount of coﬀee exported
increased 341% and international coﬀee prices 91% between the 1840s and
1890s, which implied an annual rate of grow of 4.5% in real income generated
by coﬀee exports. Using the same kind of data for other products and regions
of the country, Furtado estimated an annual per capita growth rate of 1.5% for
the Brazilian economy as a whole in the second half of the 19th century, which
would continue into the 20th century. The conclusions concerning the long-term
growth of Brazil as compared to the United States and Western Europe were
unmistakable, claimed Furtado.
The data presented ... throw some light on the problem of the present-day [1950s]
relative backwardness of the Brazilian economy. That backwardness has its roots
not in the rate of development of the past century [ca. 1850-1950], which seems
to have been reasonably rapid, but in the reversal which occurred in the previous
three quarters of a century. Since Brazil was unable to integrate herself into the
expanding currents of world trade during that period of fast transformation of the
economic structures of more progressive countries, sharp disparities were created
between the Brazilian economic system and those of Western Europe (Furtado
[1959] 1963, p. 165).
Furtado’s results have been only in part conﬁrmed by modern quantitative
history. According to Maddison (1994, p. 22), the rate of growth of per capita
income in Brazil was as low as 0.2% between 1820 and 1870, against 1.2%
for the US. The lower turning point of Brazilian long-term economic growth
apparently took place later than claimed by Furtado – Maddison’s data indicate
that it was only after the First World War that the economy started to grow
persistently (at a rate of 2.0% between 1913-1950, as compared to 1.6% for
the US). The second half of the 19th century was still a time of low growth in
Brazil (0.3% in the period 1870-1913; 1.8% for the US in that same period) as
measured by Maddison’s numbers.
In contrast with Brazil, the United States was well integrated into
the expanding international trade that accompanied the British industrial
revolution in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century. It was mainly as a supplier of
cotton – the main raw-material for world trade – to the British textile industry
that the American economy participated in the growth of the international
economy at the time (Furtado ([1959] 1963, chapter 18). Cotton, cultivated
in the slave states of the South, represented more than half of the value of
American exports and it was “the ﬁrst dynamic element in the development
of the United States in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century” (p. 113). The
development of other American regions, such as food production in the Midwest
and manufactures in the Northeast, reﬂected the dynamic eﬀects, on aggregate
demand and imports, of the income directly or indirectly coming from the
cotton sector (see also Furtado [1969] 1970, p. 31, n. 3). Cotton production had
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been quite proﬁtable for some Brazilian regions (like Maranhão) around the
time of the American war for independence and the Napoleonic wars. However,
when large scale production started in the United States, cotton prices fell
sharply and Brazilian producers could not compete in the international market
(Furtado [1959] 1963, chapter 16). The view that the time span 1790-1860 was
the critical period in the acceleration of American economic growth would be
elaborated in detail by North (1961a,b), who stressed the pivotal role of cotton
exports in the process. The new hypothesis about the crucial links between
cotton exports and the transformation of the American economy had been ﬁrst
advanced in North (1956), an article that Furtado probably read while working
in Cambridge on his Formação. True enough, there is no reference to North
(1956) in that book, but Furtado’s citation practices were far from orthodox. As
Furtado (1985, p. 215) would later explain, he had read so many documents in
the Cambridge libraries that he decided to restrict references only to works to
which he explicitly wanted to call attention and to the sources of data – “it was
a book of analysis, not of history; hence, it was not appropriate to give credit
to every researcher who had contributed on the plane of historical studies”.
North’s explanation of the impact of cotton exports on the US economy
was based on the “staples approach” to economic growth, which had been put
forward by Canadian historian Harold Innis ([1930] 1956]. Innis had advanced
the thesis that export of staple commodities played a key role in creating
the conditions that started the industrialization of Canada. Innis’s approach
to the general impact on the economy and society of staple production was
further elaborated and applied to American economic history by North (1955,
1956, 1961a,b). The focus of the staple approach was the potential spread
eﬀects of the natural resource-based export sector on domestic economy, which
grows through diversiﬁcation of the export basis (see Watkins 1963). Its main
hypothesis was that the growth experience of a “new” country is historically
shaped by the speciﬁc characteristics of the primary commodities (“staples”)
which that country exports to the industrial centers. Such characteristics may
be described in terms of the backward and forward linkage eﬀects concept
introduced by Hirschman (1958). If the linkage eﬀects are weak, the economy
may get caught in a “staple trap” in which the economy, instead of diversifying
its activities, remains dependent on a narrow export base and features a
declining rate of economic growth. In that case, the increment to income of
the expansion of the export sector leads to an increase in the supply of that
staple, with little eﬀect on broadening the export base or extending the size of
the domestic market.
The disposition of the income received from the export sector plays a key
role in the process. The plantation type of export commodity – as well as
mining activity – has been contrasted with family-size farm type: unequal
distribution in the ﬁrst case leads to weak linkage eﬀects, since income will
be spent in foodstuﬀs and simple necessities by the bulk of the population
and on imports of luxury goods by the others, with little impact on domestic
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investment demand. Such divergent patterns are also relevant for investment
in knowledge, as pointed out by North (1961a, pp. 4–5):
Under the plantation system, with its marked inequality of incomes, the planter
will be reluctant to devote his tax monies to expenditure for education or research
other than that related to the staple commodity. In contrast, the region with
more equitable income distribution will be aware of the stake in improving its
comparative position through education and research, and be willing to devote
public expenditures in these directions. This will improve its relative position in a
variety of types of economic activity and broaden the resultant economic base.
The sugar economy of the Brazilian Northeast in the colonial era, examined
in detail in part II of Formação, was interpreted by Furtado ([1950] 1963,
pp. 56–57) as a slave plantation system in which an outward impulse did
not bring about a self-generated process of economic development. A similar
argument applied to enclave mining economies, such as Bolivia, as suggested by
Furtado at the 1957 conference of the International Economic Association on
development. Despite large (mostly foreign) investment in mining and overhead
capital, which resulted in a substantial increase of exports, the Bolivian
economy had remained stationary even in the 20th century. The system of
appropriation and utilization of the country’s surplus (in the classical Ricardian
sense) was not changed by investment in mining, since the structure of internal
demand remained the same. This was explained by the double fact that mining
employed only a tiny fraction of the country’s labor force, and the proﬁts it
generated were almost entirely transferred abroad. Consequently, the impact
of investment on the composition of domestic demand was slight and could be
absorbed by the increase in imports.
The dynamics of the coﬀee economy in Brazil, especially after the end
of slavery, was signiﬁcantly distinct from the pattern described in the last
paragraph. The same amount of investment in a labor-intensive commodity
such as coﬀee would have diﬀerent eﬀects, as shown by the Brazilian economic
growth process. The large increase in aggregate volume of real wages,
accompanied by the investment of coﬀee proﬁts in domestic economic activities,
caused broad changes in the structure of demand, which started the ﬁrst round
of the industrialization process in Brazil.
If external demand absorbs increasing quantities of coﬀee over a prolonged period,
a very substantial change may take place in the structure of demand. In so far
as internal supply keeps pace with these changes, possession of the surplus will
inevitably be transferred from the traditional landowner class to the commercial
and industrial entrepreneurial class. As ﬁrst generation entrepreneurial classes have
a high propensity to save, the concentration of part of the surplus in their hands
will be conductive to a considerable increase in reproductive investment... The
underlying process of social change takes place under the stimulus of exogenous
factors, namely, the creation of a ﬂow of exports or an inﬂow of resources from
abroad (Furtado 1961a, p. 71).
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The ﬁrst phase of the Brazilian industrialization process was thus
induced by expansion of exports, followed by another stage characterized
by import-substituting industrialization (Furtado [1959] 1963, part 5; [1969]
1970, part 4). The recent “revision” of the role of exports in the economic
development of Latin America (see Ficker 2005; Haber 2006) is largely a
repetition of Furtado’s interpretation, although written as a criticism of
structuralist economic historiography.
4. Colonial Institutions and Long-Term Development
Although the immediate cause of the divergent growth trajectories of the
Brazilian and American economies since mid 18th century was related to the
long lasting stagnation of exports in Brazil, there were deeper causes associated
by Furtado with the economic and political organization of the Brazilian
colonial economy from the 16th to the 18th centuries. The colonial foundations
of the Brazilian economy and society were the subject of his 1948 Ph.D. thesis,
written under the inﬂuence of Caio Prado Junior’s ([1942] 1967] classic book
(see also the paper by Celso Furtado’s son André Tosi Furtado 2009). Furtado
([1948] 2001, pp. 109–10) distinguished between settlement colonization in the
17th century in New England, New York and Pennsylvania on one side and in
the tropical areas of Latin America. The distinction was further elaborated
in Furtado (1954, chapter II) and especially in Formação (chapters 5 and
6). Initially the productivity of the colonies of the northern regions of the
United States was below that of the plantation systems based on the exports of
tropical products, which prevailed in Brazil. Because of the small concentration
of income and the very low proportion of income that reverted to the gain of
foreign capitalists, the characteristics of the societies in the small-farm colonies
were quite distinct from those of the richer exporting agricultural colonies.
Despite lower productivity, the average standard of consumption was higher in
relation to income per capita, since spending was spread over the population
as a whole, in contrast with the tropical colonies. Such diﬀerences in economic
structure “were bound to be matched by great disparities in the behavior of the
ruling classes in the two kinds of colonies”, as pointed out by Furtado ([1959]
1963, p. 32). The independence of the ruling classes – made up of small farmers
and a group of great merchants – in the northern colonies vis-à-vis the British
metropolis would become a basic factor in the development of the United States
(pp. 33 and 109), as compared to the large farmers and slave owners that ruled
Brazil.
According to Furtado (1972, pp. 93-94), the Portuguese colonization by
means of the slave agricultural enterprise deﬁned the “basic institutional
framework” of the Brazilian society and economy, which diﬀered sharply from
the North-American institutional set up. The argument was extended to
Iberian colonization of Latin America as a whole, although the Portuguese
EconomiA, Selecta, Brasília (DF), v.10, n.4, p.849–866, December 2009 859Mauro Boianovsky
and Spanish colonization experiments diﬀered in some important aspects.
Furtado (1965, pp. 159–60) pointed out that the behavior of the economic
variables that had determined the development of the Latin American economy
was conditioned by “institutional parameters”. Iberian colonization engendered
two main features of Latin American social organization. The ﬁrst was the
the existence of an urban sector, through which power coming from the
respective European metropolis was exerted by means of a rigid administrative
structure and a descentralized economic system under the direction of agents
who had semi-feudal prerogatives. The ruling classes were formed by men
connected to the central power by bonds of loyalty, to whom the factors of
production were distributed by that central power. “Being an instrument for
domination over a society where some forms of semi-feudal decentralization
prevailed, the State emerged in colonial times as a strong bureaucracy” (p. 160),
which persisted even after political independence. The upshot is that the
“institutional framework that prevails in Latin America produces patterns
of income distribution responsible for behavior incompatible with the most
rational utilization of the available resources, that is, with the maximization of
total output within any speciﬁc time horizon” (p. 174).
Furtado’s notion of persistency of institutions and ruling elites well beyond
their original appearance played an important role in his 1948 thesis, where he
acknowledged the inﬂuence of the Belgian historian Pirenne (1914) in that
regard (Furtado [1948] 2001, pp. 145–49). The view that institutions may
persist over time has been formally and empirically elaborated by the modern
neo-institutional literature (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); see Naritomi
et alii (2009) for a study of the Brazilian case). Institution persistency is
implicit in North’s (1990) tentative explanation of the long-run factors behind
the divergent development paths in Latin America and the United States.
According to North (1990, p. 116), the US economic history has featured
a federal political system and a basic structure of property rights that
have encouraged the long-term contracting necessary to capital accumulation
and economic growth. Latin American economic history, in contrast, “has
perpetuated the centralized, bureaucratic traditions carried over from its
Spanish/Portuguese heritage” (ibid; see also pp. 102–03). North’s conclusion
has some similarities to Furtado’s, although coined in a diﬀerent language.
The divergent paths established by England and Spain in the New World have
not converged despite the mediating factors of common ideological inﬂuences.
In the former, an institutional framework has evolved that permits the complex
impersonal exchange necessary to political stability and to capture the potential
gains of modern technology. In the latter, personalistic relationships are still the
key to much of the political and economic exchange. They are a consequence of
an evolving institutional framework that produces neither political stability nor
consistent realization of the potential of modern technology (North 1990, p. 117).
The notion that exogenous diﬀerences in national heritage explains the
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diﬀerential path of development across the Americas has been criticized by
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2000) in a series of inﬂuential papers. Although
sharing North’s neo-institutional approach to economic history and growth,
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ have argued instead that institutional diﬀerences may
be ascribed to the diverse environments in which the European established
their colonies and to the ensuing very diﬀerent degrees of economic inequality.
The prevailing factor endowments conﬁguration (relative amounts and quality
of land, labor and capital) in Latin America in the colonial period brought
about, according to these authors, high levels of concentration of landownership
and wealth, in contrast with the northern colonies of British North America.
The consequent concentration of power led to the creation of institutions that
protected the privileges of the elites interests instead of protecting the property
rights of most of the society. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ’s argument represented the
culmination of a research agenda in American historiography and development
economics that started with Mosk (1951) and Hoselitz (1960). Both authors
claimed that the explanation for the economic retardation of Latin America
should be sought in the “institutional conditions which were established early
and which have shown a strong tendency to persist” (Mosk 1951, p. 367). Such
institutional conditions were largely determined by the system of land tenure
(Mosk (1951, section 1); Hoselitz (1960, pp. 88–90)).
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, pp. 272–73) suggested a classiﬁcation of three
types of New World colonies, according to their factor endowments. The
ﬁrst category comprised those colonies – Brazil and the West Indies – which
possessed climate and soil well suited for the production of sugar and other
important tropical products characterized by scale economies associated with
the use of slaves. The second type included Spanish colonies, like Mexico and
Peru, with relatively high population of natives and the distribution among few
colonizers of claims to huge blocs of native labor, land and mineral resources
(called encomiendas). The distribution of wealth in both these categories was
extremely unequal, which contributed to the evolution of institutions that
typically protected the economic interests of the elites. The ﬁnal category
was formed by the northern colonies of the United States and Canada, which
were not endowed with large native population able to provide labor nor with
comparative advantage in the production of crops characterized by economies
of scale. Abundant land and low capital requirements led to a relatively
equal distribution of wealth and the development of institutions conductive
to long-term economic growth.
The typology deployed by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ may be already found
in Furtado’s writings on the colonization of the New World. Furtado
(1954, pp. 51–72) distinguished between the Mexican and North American
colonization experiments according to the relative amount of indigenous
population, with implications for immigration and development of domestic
market. In contrast with the United States, the colonization of Mexico did
not engender an autonomous process of development, so that by the time
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of the independence the Mexican population and its average consumption
spending were probably lower than in the period immediately preceding the
Spanish conquest. The most important and long-lasting institution established
by the Spaniards in Latin America was the encomienda system, which deﬁned
the contractual framework of the occupation of the new territories (Furtado
[1969] 1970, chapter 2). The Portuguese colonization of Brazil represented a
combination of the American and Mexican cases. Like in the United States, it
featured imports of labor, capital and technique. On the other hand, it was a
commercial success, accompanied by stagnant real wages as in Mexico, albeit
for diﬀerent reasons (1954, p. 71). In particular, Furtado ([1959] 1963, part II)
pointed out that the slave plantation system was the most eﬃcient way to
minimize costs and organize production in the tropical areas of Brazil and the
West Indies. From that perspective, Furtado’s analysis of slavery was close to
the approach developed later by New Economic Historians Fogel and Engerman
(1974) in their investigation of slavery in the ante bellum American southern
states (see Versiani 2009, p. 184).
5. Final Remarks
As pointed out by Coatsworth (2005, p. 126), the recent wave of interest by
economic historians on the impact of structures, institutions and endowments
on the long-run economic development of Latin America represents in many
ways a return to the research agenda of the structuralist historiographic
tradition, with its emphasis on political economy as a crucial dimension of
economic history. The argument of the present paper is that the sense of
the “modern” ring of the structuralist approach to Latin American economic
history may be further sharpened by comparing Furtado’s methodological and
historiographic frameworks to the seminal contributions made by North to New
Economic History in general and Neo-Institutional economics in particular.
The textual evidence presented above shows some signiﬁcant parallels between
Furtado’s structuralism and North’s neo-institucionalism. Their respective
analyses of the role of exports in Brazilian and American growth processes
display some striking similarities, partly reinforced by North’s likely inﬂuence
on Furtado’s interpretation of American industrialization. Finally, both authors
stressed the key role of colonial rules in explaining the divergent long-term
paths of economic development in North America and Latin America, although
Furtado went beyond North by not restricting the discussion to the inﬂuence
of diﬀerent national (British, Spanish, Portuguese) heritages.
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